Florida Loves Non-Compete Agreements

Florida’s restrictive-covenant statute, Section 542.335, is one of the most employer-friendly in the country. A recent case from Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, Transunion Risk and Alternative Data Solutions, Inc. v. Reilly, shows how this statute favors an employer trying to enforce a restrictive covenant against a former employee. A copy of the opinion can be downloaded below.

This opinion is short on facts, but the plaintiff sued the defendant for violating a non-compete agreement and sought a temporary injunction. At the injunction hearing, the trial court ruled in the defendant’s favor after the plaintiff finished its case in chief, before the defendant put on any evidence.

The appellate court reversed. First, it looked at the likelihood of irreparable injury, citing the statute’s presumption of irreparable injury that arises when the plaintiff shows a violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant. Here, the appellate court reversed because the defendant did not present evidence:

As the trial court’s ruling was issued before Reilly presented any evidence, Reilly could not have met his burden of presenting evidence overcoming the presumption.

This doesn’t sound right. A defendant should have the right to rebut this presumption simply by cross-examining the plaintiff’s witnesses. That’s what the trial court apparently thought happened here. But the presumption so strongly favors the plaintiff that this appellate court was unwilling to allow the defendant to rebut it without putting on affirmative evidence.

The trial court also concluded that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. But the appellate court reversed this finding, noting that even when a plaintiff has suffered actual money damages,

the continued breach of a non-compete agreement threatens a former employer’s goodwill and relationships with its customers, and nothing short of an injunction would prevent this loss.

This finding essentially eliminates the adequate-remedy-at-law prong of the injunction analysis in restrictive-covenant cases.

Finally, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. On this point, the appellate court relied on the trial court’s “implied finding” that the defendant violated a restrictive covenant. So once a court finds that the defendant breached, the plaintiff has automatically shown a substantial likelihood of success.

This case shows how Florida’s restrictive-covenant statute provides employers with the upper hand in litigation. As a result, these agreements are a very effective tool for protecting proprietary information and trade secrets. All Florida companies should consult with an attorney to determine whether to implement these types of agreements.

Transunion Risk and Alternative Data Solutions, Inc. v. Reilly

“Just Doin Blow and Erasing Evidence”

As the Defend Trade Secrets Act—which would create a federal cause of action for trade-secrets theft—makes its way through Congress, critics have focused on the proposed statute’s ex parte seizure provision. In a nutshell, the statute would allow for the entry of ex parte orders to seize specifically identified repositories of evidence that are at risk of destruction.

I’ve responded to these criticisms multiple times before (see here, here, and here). The statutory protections (e.g., the party subject to the order is entitled to a hearing within 7 days) combined with federal judges’ reluctance to issue ex parte orders are, in my view, sufficient to prevent abuse.

Meanwhile, the threat of evidence destruction is real. A recent case shows how far defendants can go to allegedly destroy evidence of trade-secrets theft.

As described in Law360, a radio-controlled-vehicle company sued several former employees for violating restrictive covenants and misappropriating trade secrets, among other claims. The plaintiff filed a motion seeking sanctions against the defendants for destroying evidence.

According to the plaintiff, the defendants destroyed “scores of emails, texts, and documents that described their scheme to start at least one rival toy car and boat business.”

One of the defendants—who sounds like a real winner—apparently sent a text message talking about how he expected to get served with the complaint, saying “That’s what I’m trying to deal with now so I can’t go out, just doin blow and erasing evidence.”

In misappropriation cases, the evidence is almost always in electronic form. And it’s way too easy for defendants to destroy this evidence. While a plaintiff could seek sanctions (as the plaintiff here is seeking against the guy “doin blow”), a plaintiff would almost always rather have the actual smoking gun proving misappropriation.

The ex parte seizure provision is a powerful tool that may allow companies to preserve critical evidence.

Professors Invent Threat of “Trade Secret Trolls”

I’ve written several times in the past about the proposed legislation to create a federal cause of action for trade-secrets misappropriation (see herehere, and here). I also wrote a response to a letter signed by a number of professors who opposed this legislation. Now, Professors David S. Levine and Sharon K. Sandeen have written a law review article titled “Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls.” This article misses the mark by a mile.

Here is the article’s core argument:

The [proposed federal] Acts are most likely to spawn a new intellectual property predator: the heretofore unknown “trade secret troll,” an alleged trade secret owning entity that uses broad trade secret law to exact rents via dubious threats of litigation directed at unsuspecting defendants.

The use of the term “troll” is meant to evoke patent trolls, who have been the subject of much scorn. But the so-called “trade secret troll” is far different than a patent troll. The latter actually own patent rights, which they wield to seek licensing fees. The article’s mythical trade-secret troll is simply someone willing to bring a frivolous lawsuit to extort an undeserved settlement. I suspect the authors chose this term to piggyback on the negative attention heaped on patent trolls, thereby arming the legislation’s opponents with a pejorative term that may scare legislators or their constituents.

Putting titles aside, the article can’t reconcile its core argument with the fact that, as the authors acknowledge, “trade secrecy has been generally free of similar trolling behavior.” In other words, there is no epidemic of frivolous trade-secret lawsuits under the current state-law framework. (Certainly, there are weak misappropriation cases, just like with any cause of action. But I haven’t seen any evidence to suggest that such cases are disproportionately filed.)

The authors try to make the point that the proposed federal acts would transform trade-secrets law such that threatening and filing frivolous lawsuits would become commonplace. Yet the article does not really explain why this is so. It gets closest when discussing the proposed ex parte seizure provisions. But as I mentioned in my response to the professors’ letter, this risk is highly overblown. Convincing a federal judge to enter ex parte relief is no simple matter. And the defendant will have the right to challenge any seizure order very soon after its entry. Federal judges will not be amused if they have been manipulated into entering unnecessary ex parte orders.

The article fears that “trolls” will be able to threaten an ex parte seizure, which will be sufficient to scare a defendant into paying up before the suit is filed. Yet any innocent defendant will know that the likelihood of such an order being entered is slim. Further, simply sending the letter would undermine an attempt to get an ex parte seizure order. If the plaintiff was able to send a demand letter, thereby putting the defendant on notice of the possible claim, then a judge would be highly skeptical of a claimed need for an ex parte order.

The article also argues that unsettled interpretative questions relating to the acts will fuel frivolous lawsuits. But the article forgets that creating a federal cause of action will quickly lead to a much more robust body of published caselaw interpreting the statute. While there are very few published trial-court-level decisions in state courts, U.S. district court orders are widely available.

Frankly, state courts are much more susceptible to frivolous trade-secrets suits than federal courts. Take Florida, for example. Here, state court judges have to deal with remarkably bloated dockets. In fact, I’ve had multiple cases where it took months to get an emergency injunction hearing. State-court judges generally don’t have law clerks. And in Florida, judges often rotate between civil, criminal, family, and dependency divisions. This latter point is critical: judges often don’t spend enough time in the civil division to develop a familiarity with trade-secrets law. All of these issues lead to uncertainty, which would seemingly aid the unscrupulous litigant looking to extort a settlement. Yet, as the authors themselves acknowledge, we simply have not seen this so-called trolling.

There’s no question that frivolous lawsuits would be filed under the proposed federal legislation, just as like every other cause of action. But there is absolutely no credible reason to believe that such suits can’t be remedied with the typical mechanisms deigned to ferret out meritless claims, like Rule 11 motions.

As I’ve argued in the past, the proposed legislation has tangible benefits that aid trade-secrets owners in protecting their critical proprietary information. The arguments lobbed up in opposition—including the manufactured risk of “trolling”—don’t hold up to careful scrutiny.

Guest Post: Proving Damages in Trade-Secrets Cases

By Solomon Genet

Proving damages can be difficult in a wide range of cases, often especially so in a trade-secrets case. In a recent Federal appellate decision, the 5th Circuit (painfully for the plaintiffs) identified some of the risks involved. A link to the decision, In re Mandel, 2014 WL 3973479 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014), is below.

Here, two individuals, an IP lawyer and a database expert, came together through a joint-venture entity to develop what they conceived to be a new type of search-engine. This JV hired personnel, retained a development team, and searched for investors.  The relationship then went sour, with misrepresentations made, one partner forming a competing company without disclosing it to the other partner, and that new company raising investor funds.  Suits, counter-suits, and a bankruptcy petition followed.

Later, the bankruptcy court presided over a trial as to whether the chapter 11 debtor (before filing for bankruptcy) misappropriated trade secrets under Texas law.  While finding that the debtor-defendant was liable, the court rejected each of the plaintiffs’ damages theories (they proposed a number of them).  But then, the bankruptcy court awarded damages—$1 Million to one plaintiff and $400k to another—“without explaining the damages theory on which it relied or identifying the evidence that supported these awards.”

Although the Fifth Circuit stated that in trade-secret misappropriation cases: (1) damages need not be proved with great specificity; (2) a flexible damages approach is appropriate; (3) uncertainty as to damages does not preclude recovery; and (4) only an approximation is needed, as long as there is a just and reasonable inference in support; it held that since the trial / bankruptcy court neither identified the theory of damages nor explained the evidentiary support for the amounts awarded, even this relaxed standard was not satisfied. The Fifth Circuit remanded back to the bankruptcy court to clarify the damages issue.

Accordingly, as a practice pointer, a plaintiff harmed by trade-secret misappropriation should ensure that the court identifies how it arrived to the amount of damage suffered, and not just identify the amount of monetary damage.

Note: this decision applied Texas common law, which has since been superseded by Texas’ adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

Solomon Genet is a partner at Meland Russin & Budwick, P.A. in Miami, FL. He specializes in complex commercial litigation, business insolvency, and financial-fraud-related matters in the State and Federal courts.

In re: Mandel

AZ Supreme Court: Trade Secrets Act Does Not Preempt Claims for Misappropriation of Confidential Info

I’ve previously written about the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s (UTSA) preemption provision, which preempts tort and other claims providing civil remedies for trade-secret misappropriation. Yesterday, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Arizona Trade Secrets Act (ATSA), which is based on the UTSA, does not preempt common-law claims for misappropriation of information that is not a trade secret.

In this case, the former president of a public relations firm was sued by that firm when she left to start a competing PR firm. The plaintiff PR firm brought a claim for unfair competition, which was based on the use of confidential information the defendant learned while working for the plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the ATSA preempts claims arising from the misuse of confidential information, even where the information does not rise to the level of a trade secret.

The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, relying primarily on the plain language of the ATSA. The court did acknowledge the fact that other states have held that these types of claims are preempted. In states where misappropriation claims based on non-trade-secret confidential information are viable, it is often advisable to bring both a trade-secrets misappropriation claim and an alternative (or independent) claim for misappropriation or conversion of confidential information.

This case contains one other point of note. The defendant argued that allowing claims for misappropriation of confidential information would result in an “absurd” result. She noted that a plaintiff could obtain more in punitive damages on the misappropriation claim than it could on an ATSA claim, which allows for exemplary damages of twice actual damages where the misappropriation is willful and malicious.

In response, the court offered very helpful language to a plaintiff seeking to prove exemplary damages under the ATSA:

That AUTSA authorizes a trial court, rather than a jury, to award exemplary damages of no more than twice the amount of actual damages . . . is not necessarily anomalous. In cases of willful and malicious misappropriation, punitive damages might be easier to obtain under AUTSA than under our common law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of a defendant’s “evil mind” for a punitive damages.

Since many misappropriation of trade secrets are based on willful conduct, this case may be worth citing when seeking exemplary damages.

 

Is Facebook Buying a Massive Trade-Secrets-Theft Liability?

Big trade-secret news last week. Oculus VR, Inc., the virtual-reality company Facebook is acquiring for $2 billion. was sued by Zenimax Media Inc. for trade-secrets misappropriation. Zenimax owns popular video-game titles such as Doom and Wolfenstein. A copy of the complaint is linked below.

Facebook’s acquisition of Oculus received widespread media coverage. This lawsuit, which will likely seek billions in damages, should draw extensive media interest.

According to the complaint, when Oculus’s founder (Palmer Luckey, named as a defendant) was developing Oculus’s VR headset called “Rift,” Zenimax provided Luckey with Zenimax’s proprietary information. This information allowed Oculus to transform Rift from a primitive, non-functional prototype into a viable platform justifying Facebook’s billions. After that, the Zenimax employees involved left to work for Oculus.

There are always two sides to every story, and so far we’ve only heard from Zenimax. But the complaint paints a pretty egregious picture of trade-secret theft. One example: After leaving Zenimax, where he had signed an agreement providing that any intellectual property he created for Zenimax belonged to Zenimax, to join Oculus, John Carmack tweeted: “When you are in a hurry, and you know you wrote the exact needed code (well!) at a previous job, reimplementation grates.”

While Zenimax appears to have a strong case, I see some potential issues. Most importantly, Zenimax did not have Oculus sign a nondisclosure agreement until after Zenimax had provided Oculus with at least some of its proprietary information. Oculus will likely argue that Zenimax did not reasonably protect this information, since it shared it with a third-party without requiring a confidentiality agreement.

This leads to the biggest takeaway thus far for companies looking to protect their proprietary information: Never share this information with anyone, for any purpose, unless that person/entity executes a nondisclosure agreement.

It’s also interesting that a company as sophisticated as Zenimax would allow its employees to provide significant proprietary information to a third party without first working out, and documenting, how it would be compensated. Later on, the two companies tried to negotiate a compensation agreement, to no avail.

Finally, any company that doubts the risks employees present to its proprietary information should look at the responses to the Carmack tweet I discussed above, which has 95 “favorites.” Sample response: “that’s what USB sticks are for…”

I will monitor this case and write about its developments.

Zenimax Complaint

 

In Defense of the Defend Trade Secrets Act

In my last post, I discussed the recently proposed, bipartisan Defend Trade Secrets Act that would create a federal cause of action for trade-secret misappropriation. I wrote favorably about the statute’s mechanism allowing a judge to enter an ex parte order to preserve evidence. Since then, I’ve discussed this provision with several people who have concerns about it. This post responds to these criticisms.

To start, I want to explain why this provision is so important. Trade-secret theft is overwhelmingly accomplished by electronic means, such as through email, downloading to portable media, or via remote access to IT systems. Companies suspecting trade-secret theft can often determine where and how the information was stolen. For example, forensic techniques can identify that certain documents were saved to a flash drive on a specific date.

The Defend Trade Secrets Act permits the company, armed with this information, to seek an order requiring seizure or preservation of the media/computer/etc to which the information was downloaded. As a result, critical evidence that could otherwise easily be destroyed would be preserved. Without a statutory provision specifically authorizing this remedy, most litigants find it very difficult to convince a judge to enter this type of order.

I’ve heard concerns about the risk that judges will improvidently grant ex parte seizure orders brought in bad faith by unscrupulous litigants, potentially causing significant unjustified damage to defendants. This risk, while real, is present any time a judge hears an ex parte motion for temporary restraining order. The overwhelming majority of judges are reluctant to enter an ex parte injunction unless absolutely necessary. And this statute contains requirements that make it materially more difficult to get a seizure order as compared to a TRO.

In particular, the Defend Trade Secrets Act borrows from the Trademark Act’s procedure for seizing goods containing counterfeit trademarks. These requirements go beyond the typical TRO prerequisites. For example, the movant must show evidence that the item to be seized will be in a certain location. The court must also take measures to protect the defendant from publicity regarding the seizure. Further, the order directing seizure remains sealed until the defendant has an opportunity to contest it at a hearing that must occur within 15 days of entering the ex parte order. And as a final example, the statute provides for damages, including punitive damages, if the defendant is damaged by the wrongful entry of a seizure order.

These protections go a long way to minimize the likelihood that orders are improperly entered. In the end, the benefit of avoiding destruction of evidence—which happens all too frequently—outweighs the risk of unwarranted orders, particularly given the statute’s protections.

N.D. Ohio Discusses Damages in Trade-Secrets Lawsuits

The Northern District of Ohio recently discussed the various types of damages that can be obtained in Trade Secret Act (TSA) cases. It concluded that a plaintiff can recover for the money it spent acquiring the trade secret, but cannot recover for lost investment due to the ongoing trade-secret litigation.

In Mar Oil Co. v. Korpan, 2013 WL 5406078 (N.D. Oh. Sept 4, 2013) (link below), the plaintiff, MAR Oil Co., and defendant Korpan entered into an agreement under which Korpan would assist in MAR’s exploration for oil and gas reserves. During the agreement’s term, MAR Oil invested millions of dollars in exploration, including producing seismic readings. These readings are apparently very valuable, as they help in locating oil and gas reserves. Korpan had access to this information.

After the agreement expired, Korpan began working with the other defendants to locate oil and gas reserves in the same area, including on property where MAR Oil previously had a lease. MAR Oil sued, alleging that Korpan and the other defendants used its trade secrets, including the seismic readings.

MAR had three damages theories: (1) lost profits, (2) its acquisition costs for the readings, and (3) lost investment. There was no dispute that lost profits can be a measure of trade-secret-misappropriation damages. But the defendants argued that MAR could not recover for acquisition costs and lost investments.

The court started by discussing the damages available in misappropriation cases (citations and quotations omitted):

Ohio law [and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act] treats actual loss and unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation as two distinct theories of recovery. Each requires plaintiff to prove with reasonable certainty that it suffered a loss because of the defendant’s misappropriation. . . . [D]amages in trade secrets cases are difficult to calculate because the offending company has mixed the profits and savings from increased quality and quantity of products, as well as savings from reduced research costs, with its own natural profits.

The court then ruled that MAR can recover the money it spent acquiring the seismic data, since “if [the defendant] used MAR’s seismic data improperly, what MAR spent and [the defendant] thereby saved would appear to be a proper yardstick for a damage award.” Essentially, the defendant was unjustly enriched by the amount it would have cost to acquire the data.

As for lost investment, MAR argued that a potential investor withdrew an investment due to the ongoing litigation. The court would not allow MAR to seek damages for this lost investment, since “there must be a demonstrable link between misappropriation of the trade secret and MAR’s loss.”

As the court noted, calculating damages in misappropriation cases can be tricky. Plaintiffs need to start thinking about their damage models—and working with a damages expert—early in the case.

MAR Oil Co. v. Korpan — Order