Will Two Lawyers Go to Jail for Asserting Trade Secrets in Bad Faith?

Two South Florida lawyers are facing possible jail time, in part because of allegedly asserting in bad faith that documents contained trade secrets. They supposedly wanted to prevent disclosure of documents that proved their witness testified inaccurately. In a case pending in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court, Green Tree Servicing v. Sibon, the judge decided yesterday to go forward with an arraignment for the two lawyers representing the plaintiff, a large loan servicer, on charges of indirect criminal contempt.

This started as a mortgage foreclosure case. The defendants asserted defenses relating to the plaintiff’s “loan boarding” process, i.e., how the plaintiff uploads information from prior servicers’ records, including borrowers’ payment history.

During a deposition, the plaintiff’s representative testified that the company’s training manuals included protocols for verifying this information, including a flow chart showing the process. But the plaintiff had not previously produced those manuals. Not surprisingly, the defendants’ lawyers demanded their production.

The court entered an order requiring production of the manuals and a further deposition of the plaintiff. Three days before the deposition, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion, asserting that the manuals contained trade secrets and work product. The next day, the court entered an order ruling that the motion was not an emergency and directed the plaintiff to set the motion for a hearing (the usual protocol in Miami-Dade Circuit Court for having a judge rule on a motion).

The deposition went forward without production of the manuals. But the plaintiff never set its emergency motion for hearing. Several months later, the court entered an order requiring production of the manuals by noon that day. At 11:59, the plaintiff produced them.

Apparently, the manuals contradict the witness’s testimony. According to the judge, “the document does not contain any ‘flow chart’ that mentions ‘red flags’ that prevent loans from boarding as Mr. Ogden testified he reviewed. To the contrary, it appears from the document produced that [the plaintiff] boards the prior servicer’s records . . . and makes the loan live on its system before any verification process would even begin.”

And then it got interesting. The judge entered an order to show cause, which can be downloaded here. That order informs both the witness and the plaintiff’s attorneys that “this is now a criminal matter” and directs them to appear to show cause why they should not be held in indirect criminal contempt:

It appears that [the plaintiff] and its counsel willfully and contumaciously ignored this Court’s order by refusing to turn over the training materials. Moreover, it appears [the plaintiff] and its counsel improperly sought to have the records deemed confidential to avoid disclosure of the fact that its witness gave grossly inaccurate testimony[.]

According to an article in the Daily Business Review, yesterday, the new judge handling the case (the prior judge recused himself) “ruled that [the witness] was ‘operating at the will of the lawyers’ and dismissed him from the criminal contempt proceedings.” But she will be going forward with the criminal case against the lawyers, pending an appeal.

If true, this is an egregious abuse of the trade-secrets laws. It’s one thing to be over broad when asserting trade-secret protection. It’s another thing entirely to assert trade secrets when none exist, solely to hide a witness’s inaccurate testimony. It will be interesting to see whether these lawyers are sanctioned, and if so, how harshly.

Law Professors Oppose Federal Trade Secrets Acts, Ignore Their Benefits

I’ve written about the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Trade Secrets Protection Act previously. I’ve expressed enthusiastic support for these laws, which have bipartisan and widespread corporate backing. Today, 31 law professors issued a letter opposing these proposed statutes. Their harsh critique ignores clear benefits and overstates the statutes’ risks.

These professors’ thesis is explained at the end of the letter: “[T]he Acts are dangerous because the many downsides explained above have no—not one—corresponding upside.”

This statement and attitude ruins the letter’s credibility. These statutes have real, concrete benefits. They provide for federal jurisdiction, allowing for federal magistrates—experts in e-discovery—to oversee the complicated e-discovery issues often attendant to trade-secrets-misappropriation cases. They would allow for a uniform national trade-secret-misappropriation standard, thereby providing companies with greater certainty regarding enforcement. And the provision creating the most controversy, the ex parte seizure provision, will reduce the real risk of deliberate evidence destruction.

If these professors are not able to acknowledge that these proposed statutes offer benefits to companies facing the threat of misappropriation, I find it hard to take their critique seriously. But let’s look at their five reasons to reject these statutes:

1. Effective and uniform state law already exists. True, most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, with slight variations. But the state-by-state patchwork of statutory interpretation is not uniform. For example, different states apply different standards to determine whether a customer list is a trade secret. And state courts are often overburdened. I have personally experienced difficulty getting expedited hearing dates for emergency temporary injunction motions in state courts. Federal courts are better equipped to hear these types of motions expeditiously.

2. The Acts will damage trade secret law and jurisprudence by weakening uniformity while simultaneously creating parallel, redundant and/or damaging law. Despite this heading, the professors do not explain how applying a uniform federal standard will weaken uniformity. Instead, the professors argue that the Acts do not preempt state law, but only apply to trade secrets used in interstate or foreign commerce. Apparently, they believe that giving companies a choice between filing a misappropriation action in federal or state court is a bad thing. If companies want to litigate in state court, based on state law, these Acts permit them to do so. But these statutes would provide a second option. Given the tremendous corporate support for these statutes, companies themselves seem to want this new option.

The professors also criticize the interstate commerce provision, calling it “unclear and unsettled.” But like all statutes, this provision will become settled once tested in the courts. And the concept of interstate commerce is certainly not a new one, since federal courts routinely apply this standard to many federal statutes.

The professors also criticize the ex parte seizure provisions. Of all their critiques, this one has the most merit. I responded to this issue here. Keep in mind that evidence destruction is a real threat. I believe that it occurs routinely, particularly in misappropriation cases. In the end, I have faith that the federal judiciary will limit these orders to those cases where they are justified.

3. The Acts are imbalanced and could be used for anti-competitive purposes. The professors next argue that the Acts do not explicitly limit the length of injunctive relief. But the proper length of an injunction can vary widely based on the circumstances of a case. The judge hearing the supporting evidence is in a much better position than Congress to determine its length.

The professors are also concerned that parties will misuse the ex parte seizure provisions for anticompetitive purposes. This ignores the fact that (1) the moving party will have to convince a federal judge that the ex parte seizure order is necessary, and (2) the defendant will have the opportunity to challenge the order very soon after its entry. Again, I believe that the benefits of this provision outweigh its risks, given the built-in protections.

4. The Acts increase the risk of accidental disclosure of trade secrets.  Here, the professors argue that because of possible jurisdictional challenges based on the interstate commerce provision, plaintiffs will face motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction that will “require the plaintiff to identify and disclose its trade secrets early in the litigation.” It’s hard to reconcile the professors’ concern for anticompetitive uses of the Act (number 3 above) with their concern that plaintiffs will have to identify the trade secrets at issue. Regardless, in reality, defendants already seek more detailed information about the trade secrets at issue at the case’s outset as a matter of routine, either through a motion to dismiss/for more definite statement, or through discovery requests. This new statute will have a marginal effect, if any at all, on the timing for identifying the trade secrets at issue.

5. The Acts have potential ancillary negative impacts on access to information, collaboration among businesses and mobility of labor. The letter discusses how companies are able to label information as a trade secret to prevent public and regulatory access to important information. (Again, this is inconsistent with point 4, where the professors wanted to enable companies to delay disclosure of the trade secrets at issue.) But the professors don’t explain how the Acts would increase this practice, other than to mention the ex parte seizure provision. Yet any company (and its attorneys) that obtains an ex parte seizure order in bad faith will have to face the ire of a federal judge who they manipulated into entering the order. I think the risk is overblown.

Look, neither of the Acts are perfect. But the threat of misappropriation is real. Companies need stronger weapons in their arsenal to protect their proprietary information. These Acts accomplish that, with limited real—as opposed to academic—downside.

 

In Defense of the Defend Trade Secrets Act

In my last post, I discussed the recently proposed, bipartisan Defend Trade Secrets Act that would create a federal cause of action for trade-secret misappropriation. I wrote favorably about the statute’s mechanism allowing a judge to enter an ex parte order to preserve evidence. Since then, I’ve discussed this provision with several people who have concerns about it. This post responds to these criticisms.

To start, I want to explain why this provision is so important. Trade-secret theft is overwhelmingly accomplished by electronic means, such as through email, downloading to portable media, or via remote access to IT systems. Companies suspecting trade-secret theft can often determine where and how the information was stolen. For example, forensic techniques can identify that certain documents were saved to a flash drive on a specific date.

The Defend Trade Secrets Act permits the company, armed with this information, to seek an order requiring seizure or preservation of the media/computer/etc to which the information was downloaded. As a result, critical evidence that could otherwise easily be destroyed would be preserved. Without a statutory provision specifically authorizing this remedy, most litigants find it very difficult to convince a judge to enter this type of order.

I’ve heard concerns about the risk that judges will improvidently grant ex parte seizure orders brought in bad faith by unscrupulous litigants, potentially causing significant unjustified damage to defendants. This risk, while real, is present any time a judge hears an ex parte motion for temporary restraining order. The overwhelming majority of judges are reluctant to enter an ex parte injunction unless absolutely necessary. And this statute contains requirements that make it materially more difficult to get a seizure order as compared to a TRO.

In particular, the Defend Trade Secrets Act borrows from the Trademark Act’s procedure for seizing goods containing counterfeit trademarks. These requirements go beyond the typical TRO prerequisites. For example, the movant must show evidence that the item to be seized will be in a certain location. The court must also take measures to protect the defendant from publicity regarding the seizure. Further, the order directing seizure remains sealed until the defendant has an opportunity to contest it at a hearing that must occur within 15 days of entering the ex parte order. And as a final example, the statute provides for damages, including punitive damages, if the defendant is damaged by the wrongful entry of a seizure order.

These protections go a long way to minimize the likelihood that orders are improperly entered. In the end, the benefit of avoiding destruction of evidence—which happens all too frequently—outweighs the risk of unwarranted orders, particularly given the statute’s protections.

9th Circuit Affirms Attorney Sanctions in Trade-Secrets Case

In Heller v. Cepia, Judge Jeffrey White sanctioned the plaintiff’s attorney under Rule 11 and ordered him to pay the defendant $5,000. This week, the 9th Circuit affirmed. Both the district court’s and 9th Circuit’s opinions are linked below.

The plaintiff designed a toy hamster and shared a prototype with one of the defendants. While the opinion below doesn’t discuss the facts in detail, apparently the defendants allegedly stole the plaintiff’s toy hamster design. Trade secrets come in all shapes and sizes.

The court found that two allegations in the complaint lacked a factual basis: (1) sign-in sheets produced by a defendant (The Bean) appeared to confirm that representatives of another defendant (Cepia) were at The Bean’s offices at a time when The Bean had the hamster prototype, and (2) when confronted with information suggesting Cepia was given access to the plaintiff’s trade secrets, the other defendants refused to provide information about their relationship with Cepia.

Regarding the sign-in sheets, the evidence showed that The Bean simply did not produce any sign in sheets for the week in question. Per the court, the plaintiff went too far when it alleged that the sign-in sheets confirmed Cepia’s presence: “contrary to the implication of Heller’s allegation, The Bean’s sign in sheets do not confirm anything.” (emphasis in original).

Regarding the defendants’ refusal to provide information, the court found that “there is no credible evidence to support Heller’s allegation.”

When imposing sanctions, the court found that “the nature of these unsupported allegations stem from exaggerations for which Heller’s counsel is culpable. He is the one who drafted the complaint and the allegations at issue.”

Lawyers sometimes get carried away when drafting a complaint. Obviously, everyone wants their case to sound as strong as possible. But this case shows the value of being conservative when describing the facts in a pleading.

Heller v. Cepia, N.D. Cal.

Heller v. Cepia, 9th Circuit

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