Tag Archives: Litigation

Supreme Court Discusses Trade Secrets During Oral Argument

April 23, 2019 By in Case Summary, Trade secrets, Trade Secrets In the News Tags: , , , Leave a comment

Yesterday, the Supreme Court held oral argument Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, a case involving an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Supreme Court’s Public Information Office granted me a press pass to cover the arguments for this blog, since the case involves trade-secrets issues.

02264485

As I discussed previously, the FOIA contains an exemption for “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” which does not need to be disclosed publicly. 5 USC 552(b)(4). This case addresses the scope of this exemption.

First, some background. Food Marketing Institute is a trade association representing retailers who operate tens of thousands of retail food stores. Argus Leader is a newspaper in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. As part of an investigation of food-stamp fraud, the newspaper filed a FOIA request with the USDA for data showing the amount of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—formerly the Food Stamp Program—redemptions at individual stores.

While much SNAP data is publicly available, this store-level information is not. At the District Court, USDA presented evidence that the store-level data would provide a competitive advantage to other companies if released publicly. After a two-day trial, the District Court disagreed and ordered disclosure. The USDA gave notice to the retailers that it would not appeal, at which point Food Marketing Institute intervened to appeal on the USDA’s behalf.

The Eighth Circuit affirmed, relying on the D.C. Circuit’s test in Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), which eight circuits subsequently adopted. Under this test, the above exemption only applies if (1) the information at issue is kept private and not disclosed, and (2) “substantial competitive harm” would likely result if the information is publicly disclosed.

Food Marketing Institute argues that the National Parks test ignores the common meaning of the word “confidential,” thereby adding an “extratextual” requirement of showing competitive harm. Instead, it argues, the Court should apply its longstanding rules of statutory construction and give “confidential” its ordinary meaning, i.e., information “that is privately held and not disseminated,” without the need to show competitive harm if disclosed.

During oral argument, much of the Court’s questions for Food Marketing Institute’s lawyer, Evan Young, involved threshold justiciability issues that are outside this blog’s scope.

But, for our purposes, things got more interesting when Argus Leader’s lawyer, Robert Loeb, got his turn. One of Argus Leader’s primary arguments is that the Court should not look to the ordinary meaning of the term “confidential.”  Instead, because Congress used the language “trade secrets and commercial or financial information,” the Court should look to the then-existing common-law meaning of that term of art.

In its brief, Argus Leader argues that when the above exemption was enacted:

There was an established common-law term of art for non-public business information, disclosure of which would be tortious because it would cause competitive harm. Both courts and the relevant (and near-universally adopted) provisions in the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1939) used the term “trade secrets and other confidential commercial information” (or some near-identical equivalent) to refer to this body of protected materials. Thus, in saying “trade secrets and other confidential commercial information,” courts and commentators meant non-public business information that would likely cause competitive harm if released.

Much of the Court’s questioning of Loeb focused on this argument. Justice Kagan, sounding like her more conservative colleagues, asked him to “give me your best textual argument” for why National Parks correctly interpreted the statute. Loeb responded by saying that the Court needs to look at the words Congress used in context, and that under common law, trade secrets included a competitive-harm requirement.

Justice Sotomayor responded by saying that the Court normally only applies common law to interpret statutory language when there is a term of art. Here, case law used different terms and phrases to cover trade secrets and confidential information. In response, Loeb argued that under the common law, there were two categories, trade secrets and confidential information. And both required a showing of competitive harm.

This didn’t seem to satisfy Justice Gorsuch, who noted that when a statute uses different words from the common law, it’s usually presumed that Congress intended a meaning other than the common law.

Justice Breyer focused on the concept of harm and how such a term would be defined. Noting that “you don’t have to write this opinion, but I might,” Justice Breyer pushed Loeb to clarify what words should be used in the opinion to describe the nature of harm that must be shown. Loeb again pointed to the common law.

Justice Alito asked whether, under common law, a showing of competitive harm was part of the claim itself or only a means for proving damages. Per Loeb, under common law, competitive harm is part of the essence of a trade secret.

Based on the Justices’ comments at oral argument, at least some of them have issues with the justiciability of this case, questioning whether Food Marketing Institute’s claims can be redressed or if they are moot. But if the Court reaches the merits of this case, I predict that it will strike the National Parks test, opting for the customary definition of “confidentiality,” without a showing of competitive harm.

Supreme Court to (Possibly) Address Trade Secrets

April 7, 2019 By in Case Summary, Defend Trade Secrets Act, Florida Non-Compete Lawyer, Trade secrets, Trade Secrets In the News Tags: , , , , 2 Comments

The U.S. Supreme Court rarely hears cases involving trade secrets, primarily because trade secrets have historically been governed by state law. Now that we have the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), it is more likely that the Court will have to address Circuit splits on statutory interpretation. But thus far, no such issues have reached the Supreme Court.

In a few weeks, however, the Court will hear oral argument in Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Lender Media, a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) case that involves trade-secrets issues.

The FOIA contains an exemption for “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” which does not need to be disclosed publicly. 5 USC 552(b)(4). This exemption has been interpreted to require proof that disclosure would cause substantial harm to the information source’s competitive position. Circuits have split on how to interpret this test.

The petitioner is asking the Court to dispense with this test and instead hold that the term “confidential” be interpreted under its ordinary meaning, i.e., information “that is privately held and not disseminated,” without the need to show competitive harm if disclosed. See Petitioner’s Brief at p. (i). Alternatively, the petitioner wants the Court to clarify that the substantial harm test is satisfied if “the party opposing disclosure establishes a reasonable possibility that disclosure might injure financial or competitive interests.” Id.

Since the statutory exemption includes trade secrets alongside confidential information, the Court may offer insight into how trade secrets are defined under the FOIA. In such a case, the Court’s comments could carry substantial weight in DTSA cases. Regardless, this case presents important issues for any company that seeks to protect its confidential information  and trade secrets when contracting with the government.

Can Filing for Bankruptcy Invalidate a Noncompete?

August 9, 2018 By in Noncompete Tags: , , , , Leave a comment

Guest post by Solomon B. Genet.

Debtors and their lawyers sometimes use a bankruptcy filing as an offensive tool. In a recent case, a debtor tried to use his prior bankruptcy to shed his non-compete obligations. While this attempt was not successful, non-compete practitioners should be aware of this effort.

In In re Capps, a July 26, 2018 decision from the District of Kansas Bankruptcy Court, the individual debtor sold his company and signed an employment agreement with the buyer, agreeing to a series of non-compete, non-solicit and confidentiality obligations. The debtor later filed for bankruptcy, and the buyer fired him soon thereafter.  The buyer then discovered that the debtor was breaching his restrictive covenants and brought an action for declaratory relief in the bankruptcy court seeking a finding that the bankruptcy process and discharge did not relieve him of these obligations.

Bankruptcy Judge Nugent agreed with the plaintiff-buyer and rejected the debtor’s arguments, reasoning that: (1) the debtor’s breaches of the restrictive covenants occurred post-bankruptcy, and gave rise to “equitable” (i.e., injunctive) relief and not “a right to payment,” so the debtor did not discharge any debts arising from the agreements; and (2) the restrictive covenants were not “executory” contracts (material obligations on both sides), and therefore could not be rejected through the bankruptcy process.

The Capps debtor was unsuccessful in shedding his obligations.  But—hypothetically—a strategic legal counselor could use the Capps debtor’s arguments in a case with more favorable facts (and perhaps different applicable law) to assist a person subject to a non-compete to obtain relief long before his contracted time-period for his non-compete obligations expired.

A copy of the opinion can be downloaded here.

Federal Court Addresses Defend Trade Secret Act Immunity

April 6, 2018 By in Defend Trade Secrets Act, Trade secrets, Trade Secrets in Discovery Tags: , , 1 Comment

The Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030, et seq., provides immunity from liability for misappropriation of trade secrets in certain circumstances, namely if the disclosure:

(A) is made–

(i) in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or indirectly, or to an attorney; and

(ii) solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or

(B)  is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such filing is made under seal.

Since the DTSA was enacted in May 2016, there have not been many cases analyzing this portion of the statute. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania examined it in a recent opinion, Christian v. Lannett Co., Inc., E.D. Pa. Case No. 16-963 (the opinion can be downloaded below).

Christian is an unusual trade-secret case, as it started when the plaintiff asserted claims for employment discrimination. During discovery, the defendant learned that the plaintiff had retained a company laptop, which led to the plaintiff producing 22,000 pages of documents. Per the defendant, these contained trade secrets.

The defendant then filed a counterclaim under the DTSA, as well as other related claims, based on the plaintiff’s disclosure of trade secrets. But there was apparently no evidence of disclosure to anyone except the plaintiff’s lawyer, who only received the documents to produce them in the litigation.

The court concluded that “Plaintiff’s alleged disclosure was made to Plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to a discovery Order of this Court, within the context of a lawsuit regarding violations of Title VII, the ADA, and the FMLA,” and applied the immunity provision above to bar the DTSA claim.

The court did not specifically cite the immunity provision. And a strict application of that provision would seem to exclude the plaintiff from its protection, since the disclosure was not “solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law.” But the court’s decision is well within the spirit of the DTSA, which should not be used to prevent parties in litigation from communicating freely with, and providing discoverable documents to, their counsel.

Christian v Lannett

 

Will Two Lawyers Go to Jail for Asserting Trade Secrets in Bad Faith?

December 15, 2017 By in Case Summary, Florida Non-Compete Lawyer, Trade secrets, Trade Secrets In the News Tags: , , , Leave a comment

Two South Florida lawyers are facing possible jail time, in part because of allegedly asserting in bad faith that documents contained trade secrets. They supposedly wanted to prevent disclosure of documents that proved their witness testified inaccurately. In a case pending in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court, Green Tree Servicing v. Sibon, the judge decided yesterday to go forward with an arraignment for the two lawyers representing the plaintiff, a large loan servicer, on charges of indirect criminal contempt.

This started as a mortgage foreclosure case. The defendants asserted defenses relating to the plaintiff’s “loan boarding” process, i.e., how the plaintiff uploads information from prior servicers’ records, including borrowers’ payment history.

During a deposition, the plaintiff’s representative testified that the company’s training manuals included protocols for verifying this information, including a flow chart showing the process. But the plaintiff had not previously produced those manuals. Not surprisingly, the defendants’ lawyers demanded their production.

The court entered an order requiring production of the manuals and a further deposition of the plaintiff. Three days before the deposition, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion, asserting that the manuals contained trade secrets and work product. The next day, the court entered an order ruling that the motion was not an emergency and directed the plaintiff to set the motion for a hearing (the usual protocol in Miami-Dade Circuit Court for having a judge rule on a motion).

The deposition went forward without production of the manuals. But the plaintiff never set its emergency motion for hearing. Several months later, the court entered an order requiring production of the manuals by noon that day. At 11:59, the plaintiff produced them.

Apparently, the manuals contradict the witness’s testimony. According to the judge, “the document does not contain any ‘flow chart’ that mentions ‘red flags’ that prevent loans from boarding as Mr. Ogden testified he reviewed. To the contrary, it appears from the document produced that [the plaintiff] boards the prior servicer’s records . . . and makes the loan live on its system before any verification process would even begin.”

And then it got interesting. The judge entered an order to show cause, which can be downloaded here. That order informs both the witness and the plaintiff’s attorneys that “this is now a criminal matter” and directs them to appear to show cause why they should not be held in indirect criminal contempt:

It appears that [the plaintiff] and its counsel willfully and contumaciously ignored this Court’s order by refusing to turn over the training materials. Moreover, it appears [the plaintiff] and its counsel improperly sought to have the records deemed confidential to avoid disclosure of the fact that its witness gave grossly inaccurate testimony[.]

According to an article in the Daily Business Review, yesterday, the new judge handling the case (the prior judge recused himself) “ruled that [the witness] was ‘operating at the will of the lawyers’ and dismissed him from the criminal contempt proceedings.” But she will be going forward with the criminal case against the lawyers, pending an appeal.

If true, this is an egregious abuse of the trade-secrets laws. It’s one thing to be over broad when asserting trade-secret protection. It’s another thing entirely to assert trade secrets when none exist, solely to hide a witness’s inaccurate testimony. It will be interesting to see whether these lawyers are sanctioned, and if so, how harshly.

Florida Companies: Are Your Non-Competes Missing This Critical Provision?

June 15, 2017 By in Advice, Case Summary, Florida Non-Compete Lawyer, Noncompete Tags: , , , , , Leave a comment

Under Florida’s restrictive-covenant statute, Section 542.335(f), a restrictive covenant is only enforceable by a successor entity or third-party beneficiary if the agreement so provides. This provision can become very important following corporate merger or sale transactions. Or in the due-diligence period leading up to those transactions.

In a recent Florida case, Collier HMA Physician Mgmt, LLC v. Menichello, the plaintiff almost fell victim to this statutory requirement. A copy of the opinion can be downloaded here.

In this case, the plaintiff owns a healthcare business employing approximately 40 doctors. It also operates two hospitals and clinics. The defendant, a physician, previously worked for the plaintiff, where he signed a non-compete agreement prohibiting him from working for certain of the plaintiff’s competitors. After his departure, he accepted a position with one of those competitors, and the plaintiff filed suit.

The physician argued that a merger transaction involving the plaintiff’s corporate parent triggered the statutory provision above. Per the physician, since the agreement did not expressly provide for enforcement by successors, the merger invalidated the non-compete. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor.

The appellate court reversed. To reach that conclusion, it interpreted the term “successor” in the statute as “a corporation that, through amalgamation, consolidation, or other assumption of interests, is vested with the rights and duties of an earlier corporation.”

The court found that “the status of [the plaintiff] after the merger does not comport with the standard definition of a successor as it relates to corporations or other business entities.” In particular, there were several tiers of corporate entities between the plaintiff and the parent company that was subject to the merger. While the ownership of the ultimate parent company changed, “nothing about the corporate structure or ownership of [the plaintiff] was different after the merger”; it “continued in existence as a single member limited liability company.”

In the end, the plaintiff here was able to enforce its non-compete agreement. But all of this trouble could have been avoided. This leads to a very simple takeaway: when drafting restrictive covenants in Florida, include a provision allowing their enforcement by successors and assigns. Florida companies with existing restrictive-covenants should have a lawyer review them for compliance with this statute.

Similarly, anyone considering acquiring or merging with a company with Florida employees/independent contractors needs to have a lawyer review any restrictive covenants for this purpose.

The failure to include this provision could lead to all sorts of problems. For example, it could impede a later merger or sale of the company. But any Florida company can avoid these problems by having a lawyer conduct a simple review.

 

ABA Ethics Opinion: Trade-Secrets Lawyers Need to Encrypt Emails

May 11, 2017 By in Advice, Cybersecurity, Trade secrets, Trade Secrets Best Practices Tags: , , , , 1 Comment

By definition, lawyers working on trade-secrets issues, whether in litigation or otherwise, have access to their clients’ most confidential information. And, of course, these lawyers routinely communicate with clients via email, including about the trade secrets. Sometimes, even the trade secrets themselves are exchanged via email.

This raises ethical issues. Recently, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a formal opinion addressing lawyers’ ethical obligations when transmitting confidential client information. The opinion can be downloaded here.

All lawyers who deal with trade-secrets issues should read the opinion. But here are some highlights:

The opinion recognizes that law firms are hacking targets because:

(1) they obtain, store and use highly sensitive information about their clients while at times utilizing safeguards to shield that information that may be inferior to those deployed by the client, and (2) the information in their possession is more likely to be of interest to a hacker and likely less voluminous than that held by the client.

It then discusses applicable ethical rules, concluding that “lawyers must exercise reasonable efforts when using technology in communicating about client matters.” So what are reasonable efforts?

What constitutes reasonable efforts is not susceptible to a hard and fast rule, but rather is contingent upon a set of factors. In turn, those factors depend on the multitude of possible types of information being communicated (ranging along a spectrum from highly sensitive information to insignificant), the methods of  electronic communications employed, and the types of available security measures for each method.

The opinion specifically mentions lawyers who deal with trade secrets, since those matters “may present a higher risk of data theft.” The fact-based analysis is often relatively simple in trade secrets cases: if you are transmitting your client’s trade secrets or related information, you may need to use “particularly strong protective measures”:

A fact-based analysis means that particularly strong protective measures, like encryption, are warranted in some circumstances. Model Rule 1.4 may require a lawyer to discuss security safeguards with clients. Under certain circumstances, the lawyer may need to obtain informed consent from the client regarding whether to the use enhanced security measures, the costs involved, and the impact of those costs on the expense of the representation where nonstandard and not easily available or affordable security methods may be required or requested by the client. Reasonable efforts, as it pertains to certain highly sensitive information, might require avoiding the use of electronic methods or any technology to communicate with the client altogether, just as it warranted avoiding the use of the telephone, fax and mail in Formal Opinion 99-413.

There is a simple takeaway for all trade-secrets lawyers: think very carefully about how you are transmitting confidential client info. This requires an open dialogue with the client. You need to figure out how you will be protecting this data while in transit (and at rest, but that’s a separate issue). At my firm, we have the capacity to encrypt individual emails on-demand, which can allow for secure transmission of sensitive data.

But this sensitive data isn’t only shared with clients. Often, it will need to be produced in litigation. Lawyers spend a lot of time negotiating protective/confidentiality orders with attorney’s eyes only (AEO) protections. But don’t forget to securely transmit AEO documents to the other side. For example, my firm uses a secure/encrypted document sharing platform.

Trade-secrets cases often move fast. But this ABA opinion shows that regardless of how intense the litigation becomes, lawyers must be cognizant of their obligations to protect clients’ confidential information.

Florida’s Restrictive Covenant Statute: The Power of Presumption

March 16, 2017 By in Case Summary, Florida Non-Compete Lawyer, Noncompete, Trade secrets, Uncategorized Tags: , , Leave a comment

Florida has one of the most employer-friendly restrictive-covenant statutes in the country, Section 542.335, Fla. Stat. For example, the statute prohibits judges from considering any hardship suffered by the person against whom enforcement is sought. The statute also contains a rebuttable presumption that a violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant creates irreparable injury. Yesterday, Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal (which covers Miami-Dade County) issued an opinion showing the power of this presumption. The opinion, in Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, can be downloaded here.

Allied manufactures and distributes water-treatment chemicals. Defendant Given worked as a regional sales manger for Allied and signed a non-compete agreement. As part of his employment, he received training regarding various aspects of Allied’s business. Given resigned from Allied to work for Univar, a company that competes with Allied. Allied filed suit and sought a temporary injunction, which the trial court denied on the grounds that Allied failed to show irreparable harm.

The appellate court focused on the rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury and described the evidence offered by Allied:

At the evidentiary hearing on the motion for temporary injunction, Allied presented unrebutted evidence of the existence of statutorily legitimate business interests to be protected and evidence that Given had substantial relationships with specific prospective or existing Allied customers. Allied’s president, Mr. Palmer, testified that his company had trained Given, over the course of Given’s six-year employment, in its manufacturing and production techniques, marketing strategies, and confidential pricing strategies. In addition, Given had knowledge of existing and prospective customers, and had been sent to several trade meetings to cultivate these contacts.

Thus, the court concluded that Allied had successfully shifted the burden to Given to establish the absence of irreparable injury. But Given “failed to present any such evidence.”

Interestingly, Given argued that because he had not yet begun actively working for Univar, he had not breached the noncompete and no damages were incurred. But he admitted that if he were not enjoined, he would start working for Univar. The court rejected this argument, noting that “the only focus at the preliminary injunction stage is to maintain longstanding relationships and preserve the company’s goodwill.” In the future, plaintiffs can use this language to highlight the need to maintain the status quo.

Given Florida’s employer-friendly restrictive-covenant statute, noncompete and related agreements are powerful tools for Florida companies seeking to protect trade secrets and proprietary information. Cases like Allied show how this statute makes it easier for an employer to obtain an injunction prohibiting violations of a restrictive covenant.

Another Federal Court: No Heightened Pleading Standard in Defend Trade Secret Act Cases

March 15, 2017 By in Case Summary, Defend Trade Secrets Act, Trade secrets Tags: , , Leave a comment

Previously, I wrote about a decision from the District of New Jersey that declined to apply a heightened pleading standard to Defend Trade Secret Act claims. Now, another federal court has reached the same conclusion. A copy of the opinion can be downloaded below.

In Aggreko, LLC v. Barreto, pending in the District of North Dakota, the plaintiff and one of the defendants, Elite Power, are competitors in the generator-renting industry. Defendant Barreto previously worked as Aggreko’s sales manager. Aggreko alleges that Barreto resigned under false pretenses, thereby hiding his intention to work for Elite Power. And on the way out, Barreto allegedly downloaded Aggreko’s trade secrets and confidential information. Aggreko sued Elite Power and Barreto for violations of the Defend Trade Secret Act, among other claims.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Aggreko failed to plead its misappropriation claims with sufficient particularity. The court rejected this argument:

All that is required at this stage of the proceedings is an allegation that Barreto misappropriated Aggreko’s trade secrets sufficient to put the defense on notice as to the nature of the claim. Aggreko has alleged Barreto wrongfully acquired its trade secrets and provided them to Elite Power. Aggreko describes its trade secrets as including customer lists and information regarding Aggreko’s operations, customers, business proposals, pricing strategy, client preference and history, and proprietary pricing models known only to Aggreko; a description which the Court finds is clearly adequate under Rule 8. The discovery process will provide the parties with the details relevant to the claims, most of which are known to Barreto.

In this case, it sounds like the plaintiff only offered high-level allegations of the trade secrets at issue. And those allegations survived a motion to dismiss. This, along with the case discussed in my prior post, should be encouraging to trade-secret plaintiffs who are leery of a possible heightened pleading standard in federal court.

Aggreko v. Barreto Order

Federal Court Denies Expedited Discovery In Defend Trade Secret Act Case

February 28, 2017 By in Advice, Case Summary, Defend Trade Secrets Act, Florida Non-Compete Lawyer, Trade secrets, Uncategorized Tags: , , , , , , , , Leave a comment

Trade-secret-misappropriation cases can move fast. Often, the plaintiff files a motion for temporary restraining order alongside its complaint. Sometimes, the plaintiff has enough evidence already to justify a TRO. Other times, the plaintiff needs to take discovery before the TRO hearing.

But the typical discovery deadlines in the rules of civil procedure are not well suited for these TRO proceedings. Thus, plaintiffs regularly seek expedited discovery. In my experience, the parties are often able to agree to an expedited discovery schedule, since defendants usually want to take discovery as well. But when the parties cannot agree, the court needs to get involved. A recent case out of the Middle District of Florida shows the importance of narrowly tailoring expedited discovery requests, particularly when asking a judge to permit this type of discovery.

In Digital Assurance Certification, LLC v. Pendolino, the plaintiff works with municipal bond issuers to comply with various SEC regulations. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant, a former employee, left to work for a competitor. And in his final week of work, according to the plaintiff, the defendant used a USB drive to access every document on the plaintiff’s shared drive. Thus, the plaintiff brought claims for violations of the Defend Trade Secret Act and the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act, among others, and filed a motion for a TRO.

In advance of the TRO hearing, the plaintiff filed a motion for expedited discovery. The court denied the motion. A copy of the order can be downloaded below.

The court first set forth the standard for determining whether the plaintiff had demonstrated good cause for expedited discovery:

Factors the Court considers in deciding whether a party has shown good cause include: (1) whether a motion for preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the requested discovery; (3) the reason(s) for requesting expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the opponent to comply with the request for discovery; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process the request is made.

Here, the court focused on the second factor, the breadth of the plaintiff’s requests. The court took issue with the scope of the plaintiff’s requests, noting that “while these matters may be relevant to the issues raised in DAC’s complaint, they go far beyond what is needed for the hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order.”

Take away: When bringing a motion for a TRO, the plaintiff’s lawyers need to figure out quickly whether the parties will be able to agree to an expedited discovery schedule. If not, the plaintiff needs to draft discovery requests that are laser focused on the issues relevant to the TRO hearing. In my experience, judges will allow this type of discovery, as long as the requests are reasonable. Conversely, judges will protect defendants from overbroad discovery.

Digital Assurance Certification, LLC v. Pendolino

%d bloggers like this: