Federal Court: No Heightened Pleading Standard Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act

As more plaintiffs bring claims under the shiny new Defend Trade Secrets Act, we continue to learn about how courts are interpreting this statute. On Tuesday, the District of New Jersey answered an open question: whether the statute, in conjunction with Twombly/Iqbal, requires a heightened pleading standard for misappropriation. In Chubb INA Holdings, Inc. v. Chang, the DNJ declined to apply such a standard. A copy of the opinion can be downloaded below.

In this case, Chubb sued its former employee and its competitor Endurance, alleging that the former employee worked with Endurance to solicit a large number of employees from Chubb’s real estate and hospitality division. The goal was to hire enough Chubb employees to create a “turnkey” operation for Endurance. In the process, Chubb alleges, the former employees took Chubb’s confidential information. Chubb sued for, among other things, violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Chubb did not offer sufficient allegations of actual misappropriation, as opposed to inevitable disclosure. In denying this motion, the court found that Chubb alleged “more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” citing to Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The court also focused on the pleading standard:

Plaintiffs “need not make out specific allegations as to exactly how Defendants used or disclosed Plaintiff[s’] trade secrets; there is no heightened pleading standard for a misappropriation claim, and Plaintiff[s are] entitled to seek discovery to support [their] allegations setting forth a prima facie claim.”

The court was quoting from a case interpreting a New Jersey state-law claim for trade-secrets misappropriation.

This is obviously a plaintiff-friendly interpretation of the statute. It allows plaintiffs to plead misappropriation more generally, and then obtain discovery to sharpen the details.

Interestingly, the court’s approach here—relying on reasoning from a court in its state interpreting that state’s trade-secrets law—could result in state-by-state differences in how the DTSA is interpreted.

Chubb v. Chang MTD Order

Are We Headed for a Landmark Florida Supreme Court Non-Compete Case?

A few months ago, I wrote about a Florida appellate case holding that referral sources qualify as legitimate business interests under Florida’s restrictive covenant statute (Section 542.335, Fla. Stat.). On New Year’s Eve, a different Florida appellate court disagreed, setting up a possible appeal to Florida’s Supreme Court.

In Hiles v. Americare Home Therapy, Inc.Florida’s 5th District Court of Appeals overturned in part a temporary injunction entered against the former employee of a home healthcare company, who had allegedly violated a non-compete agreement. (The case I discussed in my earlier post also involved the home healthcare industry.) The injunction was based on the company’s claimed need to prevent the former employee from soliciting referral sources.

Under the Florida statue, a restrictive covenant is only enforceable if supported by a legitimate business interest. Here, the appellate court held that referral sources are not legitimate business interests.

The court relied on one of the legitimate business interests listed in the statute: “substantial relationships with specific prospective or existing customers, patients, or clients.” Since referral sources are not specific customers or potential customers, this court found that they are not legitimate business interests.

This is faulty logic, since the statute makes clear that the list of legitimate business interests in non-exclusive: “The term ‘legitimate business interest’ includes, but is not limited to” the enumerated items, including substantial relationships with customers.

In the home healthcare industry, it certainly sounds like referral sources are very important to business success. This is likely the case in a number of industries, where business is primarily generated through referral sources. In those industries, a company should be able to protect its referral sources through restrictive covenants.

Given the appellate-court split, there is at least a chance that the Florida Supreme Court will address this issue. If it does, the case could have far-reaching effects. The Florida Supreme Court could take this opportunity to address the definition of “legitimate business interest” under the statute, and clarify what types of legitimate business interests beyond those listed in the statute justify restrictive covenants. This could dramatically alter the way Florida treats restrictive covenants. Stay tuned.

Florida Loves Non-Compete Agreements

Florida’s restrictive-covenant statute, Section 542.335, is one of the most employer-friendly in the country. A recent case from Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal, Transunion Risk and Alternative Data Solutions, Inc. v. Reilly, shows how this statute favors an employer trying to enforce a restrictive covenant against a former employee. A copy of the opinion can be downloaded below.

This opinion is short on facts, but the plaintiff sued the defendant for violating a non-compete agreement and sought a temporary injunction. At the injunction hearing, the trial court ruled in the defendant’s favor after the plaintiff finished its case in chief, before the defendant put on any evidence.

The appellate court reversed. First, it looked at the likelihood of irreparable injury, citing the statute’s presumption of irreparable injury that arises when the plaintiff shows a violation of an enforceable restrictive covenant. Here, the appellate court reversed because the defendant did not present evidence:

As the trial court’s ruling was issued before Reilly presented any evidence, Reilly could not have met his burden of presenting evidence overcoming the presumption.

This doesn’t sound right. A defendant should have the right to rebut this presumption simply by cross-examining the plaintiff’s witnesses. That’s what the trial court apparently thought happened here. But the presumption so strongly favors the plaintiff that this appellate court was unwilling to allow the defendant to rebut it without putting on affirmative evidence.

The trial court also concluded that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. But the appellate court reversed this finding, noting that even when a plaintiff has suffered actual money damages,

the continued breach of a non-compete agreement threatens a former employer’s goodwill and relationships with its customers, and nothing short of an injunction would prevent this loss.

This finding essentially eliminates the adequate-remedy-at-law prong of the injunction analysis in restrictive-covenant cases.

Finally, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. On this point, the appellate court relied on the trial court’s “implied finding” that the defendant violated a restrictive covenant. So once a court finds that the defendant breached, the plaintiff has automatically shown a substantial likelihood of success.

This case shows how Florida’s restrictive-covenant statute provides employers with the upper hand in litigation. As a result, these agreements are a very effective tool for protecting proprietary information and trade secrets. All Florida companies should consult with an attorney to determine whether to implement these types of agreements.

Transunion Risk and Alternative Data Solutions, Inc. v. Reilly

“Just Doin Blow and Erasing Evidence”

As the Defend Trade Secrets Act—which would create a federal cause of action for trade-secrets theft—makes its way through Congress, critics have focused on the proposed statute’s ex parte seizure provision. In a nutshell, the statute would allow for the entry of ex parte orders to seize specifically identified repositories of evidence that are at risk of destruction.

I’ve responded to these criticisms multiple times before (see here, here, and here). The statutory protections (e.g., the party subject to the order is entitled to a hearing within 7 days) combined with federal judges’ reluctance to issue ex parte orders are, in my view, sufficient to prevent abuse.

Meanwhile, the threat of evidence destruction is real. A recent case shows how far defendants can go to allegedly destroy evidence of trade-secrets theft.

As described in Law360, a radio-controlled-vehicle company sued several former employees for violating restrictive covenants and misappropriating trade secrets, among other claims. The plaintiff filed a motion seeking sanctions against the defendants for destroying evidence.

According to the plaintiff, the defendants destroyed “scores of emails, texts, and documents that described their scheme to start at least one rival toy car and boat business.”

One of the defendants—who sounds like a real winner—apparently sent a text message talking about how he expected to get served with the complaint, saying “That’s what I’m trying to deal with now so I can’t go out, just doin blow and erasing evidence.”

In misappropriation cases, the evidence is almost always in electronic form. And it’s way too easy for defendants to destroy this evidence. While a plaintiff could seek sanctions (as the plaintiff here is seeking against the guy “doin blow”), a plaintiff would almost always rather have the actual smoking gun proving misappropriation.

The ex parte seizure provision is a powerful tool that may allow companies to preserve critical evidence.

What’s Worse Than Having Trade Secrets Stolen? Waiting Too Long to Do Something About It.

If you discover that your trade secrets have been stolen, you must act immediately. That’s the lesson from a recent case in the Middle District of Florida, Dyncorp International LLC v. AAR Airlift Group, Inc. A copy of the order can be downloaded below.

The Plaintiff, Dyncorp, has been providing aviation services to the State Department under a contract going back more than 20 years. Apparently, the State Department is now re-bidding that contract. The Defendant, AAR, is one of the bidders. Dyncorp alleges that AAR hired former Dyncorp employees and “coerced” those employees into disclosing Dyncorp’s trade secrets, which AAR used in its bid.

Dyncorp filed suit for, among other things, violating the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act. About three weeks later, Dyncorp filed a motion for preliminary injunction that sought to enjoin AAR from using Dyncorp’s trade secrets.

The district court denied the motion, finding that Dyncorp did not satisfy any of the injunction prerequisites. Of particular note, the court found that Dyncorp’s delay in filing suit showed that it had not suffered irreparable injury:

Dyncorp admits that it was notified of AAR’s alleged misappropriation of trade secrets in April 2015 but let more than four months pass without filing suit. Dyncorp attempts to explain the delay away by arguing that it complained to the State Department and AAR and conducted its own investigation during this time, but offers no explanation as to why those undertakings and this suit could not proceed simultaneously – particularly if, as Dyncorp asserts, it was facing the prospect of irreparable injury.

This case shows that once you discover—or even suspect—that your trade secrets are being improperly used, you must act fast. Any delay can be cited by a defendant as a reason for denying injunctive relief, just as AAR did here. While not every case will demand the immediate filing of a lawsuit, you need to at least consult with an attorney right away. Then, your attorney can advise you of your various legal options, and the risks and benefits of each.

Dyncorp v. AAR — Order Denying Preliminary Injunction

Guest Post: Proving Damages in Trade-Secrets Cases

By Solomon Genet

Proving damages can be difficult in a wide range of cases, often especially so in a trade-secrets case. In a recent Federal appellate decision, the 5th Circuit (painfully for the plaintiffs) identified some of the risks involved. A link to the decision, In re Mandel, 2014 WL 3973479 (5th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014), is below.

Here, two individuals, an IP lawyer and a database expert, came together through a joint-venture entity to develop what they conceived to be a new type of search-engine. This JV hired personnel, retained a development team, and searched for investors.  The relationship then went sour, with misrepresentations made, one partner forming a competing company without disclosing it to the other partner, and that new company raising investor funds.  Suits, counter-suits, and a bankruptcy petition followed.

Later, the bankruptcy court presided over a trial as to whether the chapter 11 debtor (before filing for bankruptcy) misappropriated trade secrets under Texas law.  While finding that the debtor-defendant was liable, the court rejected each of the plaintiffs’ damages theories (they proposed a number of them).  But then, the bankruptcy court awarded damages—$1 Million to one plaintiff and $400k to another—“without explaining the damages theory on which it relied or identifying the evidence that supported these awards.”

Although the Fifth Circuit stated that in trade-secret misappropriation cases: (1) damages need not be proved with great specificity; (2) a flexible damages approach is appropriate; (3) uncertainty as to damages does not preclude recovery; and (4) only an approximation is needed, as long as there is a just and reasonable inference in support; it held that since the trial / bankruptcy court neither identified the theory of damages nor explained the evidentiary support for the amounts awarded, even this relaxed standard was not satisfied. The Fifth Circuit remanded back to the bankruptcy court to clarify the damages issue.

Accordingly, as a practice pointer, a plaintiff harmed by trade-secret misappropriation should ensure that the court identifies how it arrived to the amount of damage suffered, and not just identify the amount of monetary damage.

Note: this decision applied Texas common law, which has since been superseded by Texas’ adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.

Solomon Genet is a partner at Meland Russin & Budwick, P.A. in Miami, FL. He specializes in complex commercial litigation, business insolvency, and financial-fraud-related matters in the State and Federal courts.

In re: Mandel

AZ Supreme Court: Trade Secrets Act Does Not Preempt Claims for Misappropriation of Confidential Info

I’ve previously written about the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s (UTSA) preemption provision, which preempts tort and other claims providing civil remedies for trade-secret misappropriation. Yesterday, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Arizona Trade Secrets Act (ATSA), which is based on the UTSA, does not preempt common-law claims for misappropriation of information that is not a trade secret.

In this case, the former president of a public relations firm was sued by that firm when she left to start a competing PR firm. The plaintiff PR firm brought a claim for unfair competition, which was based on the use of confidential information the defendant learned while working for the plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that the ATSA preempts claims arising from the misuse of confidential information, even where the information does not rise to the level of a trade secret.

The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed, relying primarily on the plain language of the ATSA. The court did acknowledge the fact that other states have held that these types of claims are preempted. In states where misappropriation claims based on non-trade-secret confidential information are viable, it is often advisable to bring both a trade-secrets misappropriation claim and an alternative (or independent) claim for misappropriation or conversion of confidential information.

This case contains one other point of note. The defendant argued that allowing claims for misappropriation of confidential information would result in an “absurd” result. She noted that a plaintiff could obtain more in punitive damages on the misappropriation claim than it could on an ATSA claim, which allows for exemplary damages of twice actual damages where the misappropriation is willful and malicious.

In response, the court offered very helpful language to a plaintiff seeking to prove exemplary damages under the ATSA:

That AUTSA authorizes a trial court, rather than a jury, to award exemplary damages of no more than twice the amount of actual damages . . . is not necessarily anomalous. In cases of willful and malicious misappropriation, punitive damages might be easier to obtain under AUTSA than under our common law, which requires clear and convincing evidence of a defendant’s “evil mind” for a punitive damages.

Since many misappropriation of trade secrets are based on willful conduct, this case may be worth citing when seeking exemplary damages.

 

Trade Secrets and Public Records

Companies performing municipal or government work face unique challenges when they need to share their confidential or proprietary information with public agencies. These companies must be wary of state public records laws and the Freedom of Information Act. A recent case, All Aboard Florida — Operations, LLC v. State of Florida, et al., filed in Leon County, Florida, illustrates this.

All Aboard Florida is attempting to develop passenger rail service between Miami and Orlando. It is doing so in partnership with various governmental entities. Recently, Orlando developer Matthew Falconer served various Florida agencies with requests under Florida’s Public Records Act for various documents relating to All Aboard Florida’s efforts.

According to the complaint, these agencies told All Aboard Florida that they intended to provide Falconer with All Aboard Florida’s Florida Ridership and Revenue Study. In response, All Aboard Florida filed this complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking protection under Florida’s Trade Secrets Act. According to All Aboard Florida, this study is a trade secret:

The Ridership Study analyzes expected market share for AAF’s service, including the effects of various pricing and travel time scenarios on AAF ridership. As such, the Ridership Study is an extremely sensitive and commercially valuable document, the disclosure of which to the public could place AAF at an unfair competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis airlines and other transportation alternatives.

Under Florida’s Public Records Act, trade secrets are exempt from disclosure.

When All Aboard Florida provided this study to the government, it marked each page as proprietary and confidential. For companies facing this situation who have no choice but to provide proprietary information to a government agency, I would recommend going one step further: Label each page of any proprietary document as “Trade Secret Information Protected From Disclosure By Section 815.045, Florida Statutes” (or the relevant statute in the state at issue).

The goal is to make it as simple as possible for the government employees responding to a public-records request to recognize that the document at issue should not be disclosed.

 

Novel Legal Strategy Deflates Employer’s Trade-Secrets Case

Recently, in Putters v. Rmax Operating, LLC, 2014 WL 1466902 (N.D. Ga. April 15, 2014) (opinion linked below), the court dismissed a counterclaim for trade-secrets misappropriation, brought in response to a declaratory judgment action filed by the defendant’s former employee. When I first read this opinion, I thought that the defendant did not move fast enough, thereby allowing the plaintiff to select the forum. When I dug further, however, I found out I was wrong.

In this case, the defendant is a Texas company that manufacturers insulation materials. The plaintiff worked for the defendant for 26 years in Georgia as a sales manager, and had access to the defendant’s confidential information. After the plaintiff left the defendant to work for a competitor, the defendant discovered that the plaintiff “had downloaded documents containing proprietary and confidential information to an external hard drive.”

While not clear from this opinion, the complaint gives the back story. A copy is linked below. The defendant originally filed suit in Texas state court and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting the plaintiff from working for his new employer.

After that, the plaintiff made an interesting legal maneuver. He filed this lawsuit in Georgia state court, seeking a declaration that he is permitted to continue working for his new employer, and an injunction prohibiting the defendant from prosecuting the Texas action, since Texas courts did not have personal jurisdiction over him.

This maneuver worked. The case (after being removed to federal court) is proceeding in Georgia federal court, where the court dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim and denied the defendant’s request for a TRO.

Normally, when a defendant believes that there is no personal jurisdiction over him, he will simply litigate that issue in front of the court where the plaintiff filed the lawsuit. Here, the employee took an entirely different course and successfully redirected the litigation to a different forum. And he was able to get the case in front of a judge with much more favorable views of his case.

Takeaway: Companies should be wary of personal-jurisdiction issues when filing trade-secrets lawsuits. The last thing you want is to be bogged down in a personal jurisdiction fight before the court will even hear a temporary injunction motion. Or, even worse, you could end up like the employer in this case, who spent time and money getting a TRO, only to be whisked away to a Georgia court with a very different view of the employer’s arguments.

Also, had this company simply had its employees sign restrictive covenants (including a venue and jurisdiction clause), they would be in a far better legal position.

Order

Complaint

9th Circuit Affirms Attorney Sanctions in Trade-Secrets Case

In Heller v. Cepia, Judge Jeffrey White sanctioned the plaintiff’s attorney under Rule 11 and ordered him to pay the defendant $5,000. This week, the 9th Circuit affirmed. Both the district court’s and 9th Circuit’s opinions are linked below.

The plaintiff designed a toy hamster and shared a prototype with one of the defendants. While the opinion below doesn’t discuss the facts in detail, apparently the defendants allegedly stole the plaintiff’s toy hamster design. Trade secrets come in all shapes and sizes.

The court found that two allegations in the complaint lacked a factual basis: (1) sign-in sheets produced by a defendant (The Bean) appeared to confirm that representatives of another defendant (Cepia) were at The Bean’s offices at a time when The Bean had the hamster prototype, and (2) when confronted with information suggesting Cepia was given access to the plaintiff’s trade secrets, the other defendants refused to provide information about their relationship with Cepia.

Regarding the sign-in sheets, the evidence showed that The Bean simply did not produce any sign in sheets for the week in question. Per the court, the plaintiff went too far when it alleged that the sign-in sheets confirmed Cepia’s presence: “contrary to the implication of Heller’s allegation, The Bean’s sign in sheets do not confirm anything.” (emphasis in original).

Regarding the defendants’ refusal to provide information, the court found that “there is no credible evidence to support Heller’s allegation.”

When imposing sanctions, the court found that “the nature of these unsupported allegations stem from exaggerations for which Heller’s counsel is culpable. He is the one who drafted the complaint and the allegations at issue.”

Lawyers sometimes get carried away when drafting a complaint. Obviously, everyone wants their case to sound as strong as possible. But this case shows the value of being conservative when describing the facts in a pleading.

Heller v. Cepia, N.D. Cal.

Heller v. Cepia, 9th Circuit