I’ve written about the Defend Trade Secrets Act and the Trade Secrets Protection Act previously. I’ve expressed enthusiastic support for these laws, which have bipartisan and widespread corporate backing. Today, 31 law professors issued a letter opposing these proposed statutes. Their harsh critique ignores clear benefits and overstates the statutes’ risks.
These professors’ thesis is explained at the end of the letter: “[T]he Acts are dangerous because the many downsides explained above have no—not one—corresponding upside.”
This statement and attitude ruins the letter’s credibility. These statutes have real, concrete benefits. They provide for federal jurisdiction, allowing for federal magistrates—experts in e-discovery—to oversee the complicated e-discovery issues often attendant to trade-secrets-misappropriation cases. They would allow for a uniform national trade-secret-misappropriation standard, thereby providing companies with greater certainty regarding enforcement. And the provision creating the most controversy, the ex parte seizure provision, will reduce the real risk of deliberate evidence destruction.
If these professors are not able to acknowledge that these proposed statutes offer benefits to companies facing the threat of misappropriation, I find it hard to take their critique seriously. But let’s look at their five reasons to reject these statutes:
1. Effective and uniform state law already exists. True, most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, with slight variations. But the state-by-state patchwork of statutory interpretation is not uniform. For example, different states apply different standards to determine whether a customer list is a trade secret. And state courts are often overburdened. I have personally experienced difficulty getting expedited hearing dates for emergency temporary injunction motions in state courts. Federal courts are better equipped to hear these types of motions expeditiously.
2. The Acts will damage trade secret law and jurisprudence by weakening uniformity while simultaneously creating parallel, redundant and/or damaging law. Despite this heading, the professors do not explain how applying a uniform federal standard will weaken uniformity. Instead, the professors argue that the Acts do not preempt state law, but only apply to trade secrets used in interstate or foreign commerce. Apparently, they believe that giving companies a choice between filing a misappropriation action in federal or state court is a bad thing. If companies want to litigate in state court, based on state law, these Acts permit them to do so. But these statutes would provide a second option. Given the tremendous corporate support for these statutes, companies themselves seem to want this new option.
The professors also criticize the interstate commerce provision, calling it “unclear and unsettled.” But like all statutes, this provision will become settled once tested in the courts. And the concept of interstate commerce is certainly not a new one, since federal courts routinely apply this standard to many federal statutes.
The professors also criticize the ex parte seizure provisions. Of all their critiques, this one has the most merit. I responded to this issue here. Keep in mind that evidence destruction is a real threat. I believe that it occurs routinely, particularly in misappropriation cases. In the end, I have faith that the federal judiciary will limit these orders to those cases where they are justified.
3. The Acts are imbalanced and could be used for anti-competitive purposes. The professors next argue that the Acts do not explicitly limit the length of injunctive relief. But the proper length of an injunction can vary widely based on the circumstances of a case. The judge hearing the supporting evidence is in a much better position than Congress to determine its length.
The professors are also concerned that parties will misuse the ex parte seizure provisions for anticompetitive purposes. This ignores the fact that (1) the moving party will have to convince a federal judge that the ex parte seizure order is necessary, and (2) the defendant will have the opportunity to challenge the order very soon after its entry. Again, I believe that the benefits of this provision outweigh its risks, given the built-in protections.
4. The Acts increase the risk of accidental disclosure of trade secrets. Here, the professors argue that because of possible jurisdictional challenges based on the interstate commerce provision, plaintiffs will face motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction that will “require the plaintiff to identify and disclose its trade secrets early in the litigation.” It’s hard to reconcile the professors’ concern for anticompetitive uses of the Act (number 3 above) with their concern that plaintiffs will have to identify the trade secrets at issue. Regardless, in reality, defendants already seek more detailed information about the trade secrets at issue at the case’s outset as a matter of routine, either through a motion to dismiss/for more definite statement, or through discovery requests. This new statute will have a marginal effect, if any at all, on the timing for identifying the trade secrets at issue.
5. The Acts have potential ancillary negative impacts on access to information, collaboration among businesses and mobility of labor. The letter discusses how companies are able to label information as a trade secret to prevent public and regulatory access to important information. (Again, this is inconsistent with point 4, where the professors wanted to enable companies to delay disclosure of the trade secrets at issue.) But the professors don’t explain how the Acts would increase this practice, other than to mention the ex parte seizure provision. Yet any company (and its attorneys) that obtains an ex parte seizure order in bad faith will have to face the ire of a federal judge who they manipulated into entering the order. I think the risk is overblown.
Look, neither of the Acts are perfect. But the threat of misappropriation is real. Companies need stronger weapons in their arsenal to protect their proprietary information. These Acts accomplish that, with limited real—as opposed to academic—downside.